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7 Some Sociological
Explanations for the
Present Condition of
Neoclassical Economics
In this chapter we will take a somewhat impressionistic look at the
sociology of the field of economics. Given a discipline which, at the
beginning of the twentieth century, has problems that it can not
resolve, how will it develop, through the end of the twentieth and into
the twenty-first century, with the claim that it is a science - indeed, 'the
queen of the social sciences'?
MARSHALL'S Since Marshall's time it has become ever more
AMBIVALENCE, difficult to draw attention to the need for something
AND HOW IT IS besides technique to bridge the gap between the world
PERCEIVED that (presumably) exists outside our heads and the
symbols through which we communicate about the
world. Those economists who have attempted to lay stress upon this
requirement have generally seen this part of their work marginalised
under the name of 'institutionalìsm'. (They include such figures as
Myrdal, Hirschman, Streeten, Scitovsky - to name a few.) The neglect
of this part of the field may be traced to the neglect or depreciation of a
part of Marshall's work; and that began with an essay by John
Maynard Keynes.
In Chapter 5 it was noted that Marshall's persistence in bestriding
the entire path of economics, even as it divided beneath him, led to a
reputation for ambivalence, even inconsistency. Ambivalence, or multi-
sidedness, can be understood and evaluated in a number of different
ways. The interpretation that is most familiar today goes back to the
way Marshall's memory was preserved by Keynes's leading essay in
Memorials to Alfred Marshall. That essay retains its grip for good
reasons: it is readable and astute, both in. presenting a psychological
portrait, and in outlining Marshall's most specific and solid
achievements. It contains, however, some complicated twists.
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Keynes who (in spite of his disclaimers of any normative tinge) may
have been the most effective economist of all time as a giver of advice
and meddler in practical affairs, chose, in discussing Marshall, to adopt
a heavily positivist tone. Keynes leaves no doubt as to which side he
regards as the 'higher', when he discusses the 'conflict', in Marshall,
'between an intellect, which was hard, dry, critical, as unsentimental as
you could find, with emotions and aspirations, generally unspoken, o1
quite a different type. When his intellect chased diagrams and Foreign
Trade and Money, there was an evangelical moralizer of an imp
somewhere inside him, that was so ill-advised as to disapprove'
(J. M. Keynes, 'Alfred Marshall, 1842-1924', in Memorials, p. 37).
Earlier in the same essay, Keynes similarly referred to 'this double
nature', saying that 'the piercing eyes and ranging wings of an eagle
were often called back to earth to do the bidding of a moralizer' (ibid.,
p. 11).
The traditional view of Marshall which has grown directly out of
Keynes's biographical and critical sketch attempts to downplay the
multi-sidedness of the man and his work, as though it is assumed that
his memory is best served by overlooking a slightly embarrassing
tendency to be inconsistent, even fuzzy-headed. (This tendency was, by
Keynes, implicitly interpreted as a result of Marshall's moralising
tendency.) In anticipation of the prevailing wisdom of today, when it is
assumed that s/he who does something more than economics is
regarded as something less than an economist,1 Keynes regarded some
of Marshall's facets as detractions from, not additions to, his
contributions as an economist. He was uncomfortable with Mar-
shall's inclusiveness - his 'dual nature' - and tried to carve out of it for
memorialisation the part that pointed in the direction that he, Keynes,
thought economic science should develop.
It was not by accident, or inadvertently, that Marshall embraced a
variety of apparently conflicting ideas. The subject matter of economics
is itself full of ambiguities and contradictions: Marshall tried, in his
theoretical writing, to be true to the fullness and complexity, even the
contradictions, of human experience. That he continually strove to see
all sides of a problem, and to avoid expressing himself in such a way
that his work could be used in support of any singular or extreme
position
- this could be regarded as his greatest strength, not his
greatest flaw.
Marshall's outstanding methodolgical characteristic was balance:
balance between theory and facts, for example; or between tools (i.e.,
mathematics) and facts. But whereas in the first pair (theory and facts)
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he saw an essential complementarity, in the second he saw a possible
conflict; not one inherent either in the tools or in the facts, but arising
out of the frailty of human nature. He foresaw the danger that
researchers would lose interest in facts that were not amenable to their
tools, or that they would effectively lose interest in facts, as the
sophisticated development of some kinds of tools outran the quality of
available data.
Marshall remarked in one place that to avoid altogether the danger
of distortion of emphasis which accompanies the use of mathematical
and other kinds of analysis 'would be to abandon the chief means of
scientific progress' At the same time, be was aware of 'a tendency
towards assigning wrong proportions to economic forces; those
elements being most emphasized which lend themselves most easily
to analytical methods' (Principles p. 700). Above all he warned
repeatedly against 'long chains of deductive reasoning'; even in the
context of his most encouraging statement of the value of 'a training in
mathematics' and 'experience in handling physical problems by
mathematical methods' - or perhaps all the more so for being in such
a context - Marshall is concerned with the danger which he could, it
appears, already see in their employment:
It is obvious that there is no room in economics for long trains of
deductive reasoning; no economists, not even Ricardo, attempted
them But a training in mathematics is helpful by giving
command over a marvelously terse and exact language for expressing
clearly some general relations and some short processes of economic
reasoning; which can indeed be expressed in ordinary language, but
not with equal sharpness of outline. And, what is of far greater
importance, experience in handling physical problems by mathema-
tical methods gives a grasp, that cannot be obtained equally well in
any other way, of the mutual interaction of economic changes
(Principles, p. 644).
A prime reason for Marshall's often-expressed distrust of
mathematics was precisLly that mathematics permits long chains of
deductive reasoning. To modern economists, by contrast, this enabling
is one of their most attractive features. Thus Marshall's desire to
restrict the use of mathematics to the simpler situations of interest to
economics is in radical opposition to much of modern 'scientific'
thinking, which calls upon mathematical tools as our only hope of
being able to master the growing complexity of human experience.
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Looking over the successive editions of Principles, one may perceive
a tendency in Marshall to suppress his more philosophical, reflective
side, especially as it is applied to questions of methodology. A critical
reflection was thus deleted from the fifth edition: there he had called
for a 'general principle [which would] determine the point in the
widening of the scope of economics, at which the growing loss of
scientific precision would begin to outweigh the gain of increasing
reality and philosophic completeness' (Principles, 2nd edn, deleted
from the 5th edn; quoted in Var. II, p. 763). I do not have much
confidence (though I do not entirely rule out the possibility) that it will
be possible to enumerate such a 'general principle' in terms that are
specific enough to carry much weight. However, the point remains that
the field of economics is in need of renewed attention to the balance
between 'scientific precision' on the one hand, and 'reality and
philosophic completeness' on the other. In the absence of attention
to this balance, the modern tendency has been to err in the direction of
apparent scientific precision.
A view of what has been achieved since Marshall's time gives rise to
the hypothesis that, given the topics of intrinsic interest to economics,
there was, from the beginning, a finite and relatively small subset upon
which quantitative methods could effectively be brought to bear. If
Marshall was discontented with the disproportionate attention given in
his time to what could versus what couldn't be quantfled, he would be
even more so now, as the remaining unexplored quantifiable ground
has shrunk to insignificance by contrast to the vast tracts of nearly
virgin territory awaiting the development of non-quantitative
approaches.
A SOCIOLOGY In achieving even a summary understanding of how
OF ECONOMICS economics has developed from where it was at the
turn of the century, under the dominance of Alfred
Marshall, to its present condition, there are several trends in recent
intellectual history that should be noted. One is the turn towards
positivism which started near the beginning of this century and
continued as a marked trend for several decades. It is interesting to
note that Marshall is only one of a number of broad, turn-of-the-
century social science thinkers whose heirs, unable to deal with the full
complexity of their vision, whittled it down in a biased manner,
retaining the side that lent itself to positivism and ignoring or (as
Keynes did with Marshall) belittling the normative, humanistic,
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subjective, intuitive, judgment-laden side. Others beside Marshall who
have been treated in this way include John Dewey, Taicott Parsons and
Henry James. Earlier writers whose works were similarly streamlined
to fit the idea of 'science' of the early twentieth century include Charles
Darwin and Adam Smith.
Over the course of this century the natural sciences have become
progressively less certain of the infallibility or even the unique
definability of 'the scientific method'; but there has continued to be a
time lag between the methodological development of the natural and
the social sciences. Economics, suffering particularly from 'physics
envy' in its aspiration to the position of 'the queen of the social
sciences', has sought to imitate a positivist mode now considered
obsolete in physics itself.
The ambitions of economics, in the optimistic days of the 1950s and
1960s, included a boast of predictive powers. That expectation has been
disappointed as the advice and explanations of economists have come
into conflict with the events of the l970s and 1980s (stagflation,
fluctuations in the prices of basic commodities, the international debt
crisis, etc.) which they had either failed to predict or could not explain,
or on which the economics profession had apparently given poor
advice. Economists needed, then, to bolster their reputation and image
in the eyes of the public and of policy-makers.
The use of ever more sophisticated, difficult and, to the uninitiated,
impenetrable, mathematics makes it harder for the public and the
policy-makers to judge the conclusions of economics against what is
known to make sense in the real world. At the same time, in the USA,
the availability of funding through such agencies as the National
Science Foundation has increasingly emphasised the desirability for
economists of being able to speak the language of science.
I cannot cite a definite causal relationship between this history and
the fact that, at this time, it is in academia that the direction of the field
is controlled. However the latter fact does appear more firmly
established now, at least in the USA, than it was during the
'optimistic times', when a greater number of influential economists
could be found with weaker ties to academia than is now the case. Such
professionalisation is, in any case, part of a more general trend in the
natural and social sciences, as well as in the humanities.
Hence the growing importance of the four academic screening points
where all the pressures of the field channel in the same direction. The
qualities, skills and understandings
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that get a prospective student admitted to a graduate department
of economics;
that help the student to get good grades and achieve an advanced
economics degree;
that assist in the writing of papers that will be accepted by the
major journals; and
that lead to academic promotion and tenure of an economist
all encourage abstract or mathematical modelling. As regards factual,
historical, psychological, political or other contextual understandings
or skills which have a usefulness in practical application of economics,
the student develops these at peril of taking time away from studies on
'the cutting edge' of modern 'theory'; and the academic economist
employs them with little or no encouragement or reward from within
the profession.
Moreover, since the beginning of the twentieth century there has
been a drift in the character of students going into economics, as
undergraduates in mathematics, physics, and other mathematically
oriented fields have increasingly found that they have a comparative
advantage when' they go on to graduate work in economics. This has
continued to be a popular field for graduate studies, so that
departments of economics have often been able to select, from among
more applicants than they could accommodate, the students who they
thought would most contribute to the enhancement of that
department's reputation. It is difficult to test for the qualities of
common sense, judgment, intuition, imagination, etc. which would
make for a thoughtful, broad-minded economist; much easier to devise
and to grade tests for mathematical ability. A simultaneous drift has
occurred in respected economics journals, towards increased emphasis
upon abstract or mathematical modelling.2
At the fourth of the academic screening points listed above we
encounter the two modern academic imperatives: 'publish or perish'
and 'up or out'. The tenure system as it now exists sets a competition
which must be winnable by the young; the whole system tends to get
skewed to allow older faculty to give high praise to the younger
colleagues whom they would like to attract, and to allow young
professionals to acquire the requisite publishing credentials, The virtues
of elder members of the profession must stand aside in favour of what
can be offered by recent graduates. The things that require many years
to learn (roughly summarised as wisdom, and including judgment)
have to be devalued relative to The Latest Techniques, for it is in those
that recent graduates are likely to be ahead of their mentors.
The people who are most competent in the skills of youth are, then,
the ones who gain the best jobs and set the continuing standards as to
what shall be taught, what published, and how the academic screening
points will continue to be managed. The likelihood that the skills of
youth will occur in people who also possess, or will later develop, the
qualities of common sense and judgment is, fortunately, not zero; there
are some outstanding examples of individuals who have both. But there
is little or no direct cultivation of judgment and wisdom in the field.
THE CHOICE OF The preceding section gave reasons why the lead in
LANGUAGE: defining the major modern systems of economic
WHERE WE ARE theory (Marxian as well as neoclassical) has
AND WHAT increasingly been taken by those individuals capable
MIGHT BE DONE of doing the most dfflcult mathematics. The effect of
this situation is thrown into relief by considering
what would be the result of a different situation. If, for example, the
leading edge of the field were defined as contained in the work of
economists with another sort of skill - such as the sorts of analytical
skill (clear, logical thinking, and imagination) required in the work of
Harvey Leibenstein or Albert Hirschman - there would be less pressure
for all the rest of the practitioners in the field to strive to show that they
can operate on a mathematical frontier which may, in fact, be beyond
their knowledge or understanding.
The common desire of the 'rank and file' in any field to emulate the
leaders has both advantages and disadvantages. If the leaders are
outstanding for their conscious reliance upon common sense and
intuitive perception, inferior imitations may take the form of mushy
thinking, even while the frequency of outright absurdities may be
reduced. In the current situation in economics, occurrences of mushy
thinking take a different form, being disguised by the apparent
crispness of mathematics, and rendered invisible to their perpetrators
by their own frequent inability to interpret their results in real-world
terms. The requirement that economic modelling should have a meaning
in real-world terms is, at the moment, given scant attention in the
dominant academic arm of the field.
Whichever approach is dominant, the prevailing methodology and
techniques of a field will not be used only by those who can do so with
full competence. The reality of economic practice is not confined to the
very best practitioners; an analysis of the value of techniques must
include the ways in which they are, in fact, used. It is often said that
nothing is gained by criticising a field through a criticism of its worst
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practices. However if bad practices are widespread, and are repeated in
journals and taught in classrooms, this tells us something not only
about those practitioners, but also about the structure and sociology of
the field which tolerates, encourages or even rewards them.
Users of mathematical language are too often tempted into wading
in above their heads. It is hard enough for a first rate mathematician to
make him/herself understood by the general public; that becomes
downright impossible when a second-rate mathematician - or even, in
fact, a first-rate one - has fallen into the trap of the Peterkin Principle3
and has given in to the temptation of going one step beyond his/her
own capacity to translate the final mathematical steps back into a
verbal language. Not only does this remove the analysis from the reach
and judgment of any but a few specialists, who do not have time to
check the meaningfulness and realisticness of all their colleagues' work;
it also deprives the individual thus stretching to his/her outer limits of
the chance to check the results intuitively.
There are a variety of values to be weighed in the choice of language,
in addition to the just-cited question of accessibility to a broad range of
critics and to intuitive assessment. Another question is whether it is
more desirable to permit, or to exclude, ambiguity. That is,
Is ambiguity a proper and useful reflection of a complex reality;
and is a language loaded with ambiguity the oniy possible way of
making a bridge of translation between the complex world and our
complex minds?
Or, alternatively, is the gain in rigour more significant than the loss
in reality when we force our experience into a set of singular,
mutually consistent 'truths'?
One great strength of mathematics (when used correctly, which they
often are not; in situations of extreme complexity mathematics are oniy
used correctly when they are used brilliantly) is that they exclude
ambiguity. One definition of a properly phrased mathematical
statement holds that it can oniy have one meaning; a properly
phrased mathematical question can only have one answer, By contrast,
a great strength of most verbal languages is that they permit ambiguity.
Depending upon which value is stressed, the preference between
abstract/quantitative and intuitive/verbal languages may shift. This
chapter should not lead to the conclusion that, because of the dangers
stressed so far in relation to non-verbal languages, they should never be
used. What it should lead to is:
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a recognition that there are trade-offs in the choice of language;
and
a motive to further investigation as to what is the full set of trade-
offs relevant to any particular situation.
Some additional institutional innovations may also be necessary in
order to make it possible to develop a new way of developing and
teaching an alternative system of economic theory. For example, in
order to emphasise different qualities and skills than the 'skills of
youth' now brought to the fore by the culture of 'publish or perish - up
or out', there may need to be changes that would permit more
individual development and intellectual (and other) maturation
between the time a student finishes graduate school and the time that
s/he must be considered for tenure. One way to accomplish this would
be to say that, where social economics is taught, it would have different
tenure rules than other areas: e.g., no social economist would be put up
for tenure until s/he had completed something like three four-year
stints at different locations; and some non-academic experience in that
time would be regarded as desirable (rather than being a liability).
Given the conservative nature of bureaucracies, any change is
difficult to achieve, and the particular suggestion just put forth may
not, in any case, be the best one. It was suggested here mainly to
emphasise two central points:
A new kind of economics will require new approaches to the
education both of those who go on to practice it in the real world
and those who go on to develop and teach it.
Changes, of some kind, within universities will be required to
support such novel educational approaches.
WHY THE FIELD The sociology of contemporary economic study and
OF ECONOMICS practice shows a strong tension between the two
NEEDS MORE poles of academic versus empirical/applied econo-
THAN THE mics. The definition which was proposed in Chapter 1
EXISTING for the broad field of economics - starting from 'the
SYSTEMS OF questions asked of economists', and then modifying
THEORY these with a recognition of economics' relation to
adjacent fields of study, and of the cluster of goals
which are especially attached to this particular field -- contained a
definite bias towards application; social economics, in particular, is in
large part designed to fill an important area, which might be labelled
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policy economics, and which is inadequately illuminated by both the
neoclassical and the Marxian systems of theory.
Ultimately, the content of the field of applied, or empirical, or policy
economics is determined exogenously, by the questions that people
outside the field (in government, business, policy-making in general)
not only ask of economists, but are willing to pay them to answer. By
contrast, the methodology of academic economics has developed quite
separately from this exogenously-determined content, and is often
poorly suited to it; and the content emphasised in academic economics
is, I contend, to a large degree determined by its methodology.
One reason that this situation is of concern is that the education of
all economists, wherever they will end up upon the spectrum between
the applied/theoretical poles, is in the hands of the academic group. It
is questionable whether those who will ultimately operate somewhere
at the applied end are well prepared by a training programme designed
near the opposite pole.
Attempting to respond to the challenges of the real world, individual
economists find themselves using informal, seat-of-the-pants methods
when they step outside the area illuminated by the formal theory. A
major goal for social economics is to create a framework within which
the best of such applied work can find a home - - a framework for
generalisation about the useful real-world activities of economists - so
that it will be possible to teach that kind of economics to those who
wish to learn it. Such a framework will have to be found in another
part of the field of economics than that now claimed by the currently
dominant systems of theory.
A premise of this book is that it is unlikely that the dominant
economic paradigms can or will expand to fill the conceptual space of
the whole potential field of economics. I will suggest here only briefly
my reasons for coming to this conclusion, and will, moreover, confine
this reasoning mainly to a consideration of neoclassical theory.
The first reason to assume that neoclassical economics cannot
expand to fill the rest of the space defined as the entire field of
economics is that many excellent efforts to do just this have been
expended without avail. Economists such as Leibenstein; Simon; Sen;
Scitovsky; various game theorists; and many individuals working in the
areas of labour and, above all, development economics - all have made
valiant efforts to insert into neoclassical economics a more realistic
understanding of human nature and more realistic models of economic
behaviour, as itt has seemed that these things were necessary to an
expanded application of 'economics'. Each such endeavour has ended
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up like a grain of sand inserted into an oyster: the irritation has
produced accretions directly around the grain of sand, sometimes
resulting in a little globe of interesting ideas; but the oyster the system
of neoclassical theory - has remained unchanged.
Possible reasons why this system of theOry is so resistant to change
include the following:
Neoclassical economics has achieved a very tight (though not
perfect) degree of internal consistency. It thus effectively excludes a
large class of novel elements which, in changing some parts of the
whole, elaborately interrelated system, would throw out of kilter
their relationship to the rest.
Neoclassical economics has developed its methodology in relation
to its content in such a way that the two aspects are virtually
inseparable; but the methodology has become the tail that wags the
dog. This system of theory is inhospitable to any content which
cannot well be handled by the elaborately developed methodolo-.
gies now in use, because it would be unthinkable to reverse the
direction in which the methodology is developing. Also,
The explanation behind reason 2 is as much sociological as
intellectual. The reward systems and status orderings which have
become attached to neoclassical economics (as, over time, some
sort of reward and status systems inevitably become attached to
any developed system of theory) are now closely related to a
unidirectional type of progress which contains little possibility of
doing anything other than extending the accepted methodologies.
Reference was made, earlier, to the Peterkin Principle. The name
comes from a fictional family who always chose the most complicated
available solution (as, for example, when they sought to reconstitute a
cup of coffee chemically, after mistakenly putting salt into it instead of
sugar). The Peterkin Principle states that:
a social scientist is tempted by the reward systems of modern
academia to use the most abstract level of mathematics of which s/he
is capable; at which point of mental stretching the individual has
gone beyond his/her ability to translate the mathematical analysis
back into a verbal language - to check the results intuitively.
Contemplation of this principle and the story behind it may suggest
two conclusions for the subject at hand.
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The first is that economists (and all other social scientists) need to
exercise discipline to resist showing off the most difficult techniques of
which they are capable. Instead,
in order to press forward the frontiers of knowledge, it is advisable,
most of the time, to operate well inside of the frontier of available
techniques.
The second conclusion is that,
if the existing systems of economic theory do not suit all our needs,
we may be wasting our time trying to reconstitute the paradigms
from their present condition
in other words it is time to pour out a new cup.
The next three chapters of Part II will attempt to provide some tools
that will be useful in the development of a new system of economic
theory. In part, these are offered as tools which would be helpful in the
early stages of the development of any new system of theory in the
social sciences. More particularly, they are some elements of what I will
suggest will be needed to fill the tool kit of the social economist.
Notes
We may contrast John Stuart Mill's comment, that 'a person is not likely
to be a good economist, who is nothing else' (quoted by Marshall in
Principles, p. 636).
As early as 1953 Pigou had commented upon this trend, saying that 'To
anyone who has taken in the Economic Journal over a long period a
notable change will have been apparent. At the end of the last
century in general the articles and memoranda were written in
ordinary language - ordinary language, not even the specialist jargon
language which some people so much enjoy. Now they are predominantly
mathematical in tone' (Pigou, 1953, p. 5).
The continuation of this drift has been widely noted. See, for example,
'On the Efficient Use of Mathematics in Economics; Some Theory, Facts,
and Results of an Opinion Survey' by Herbert C. Grubel and Lawrence
A. Boland, at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, in manuscript. I am
indebted to Vassily Leontief for bringing this paper to my attention.
See the end of this chapter for elaboration of this principle.
